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 The objective of this project is to implement Condition Based 
Monitoring into Power System Protection. This project is focusing on the 
distribution level protection system with 11kV voltage rating. Our aim is to 
improve the method of detecting the fault that happens in the protection 
system, by applying CBM. With this, we suppose to be able to identify the 
malfunction within the system and prevent it from happening. This is 
important because when the malfunction happens it can disable the protection 
system and cause the whole system unprotected. Other instrument may be 
damaged which later require maintenance or even replacement and this means 
waste of production time and money. To capture the objective of this project, 
we first need to have the understanding about what is protection system and 
CBM. Then, using the knowledge and the understanding on the topic, we need 
to list the potential sources that can cause malfunction to happen or any 
potential cause that can disable/damage the protection system. This data need 
to be origined from the actual maintenance data such as statistic on the type of 
failure, root cause and the frequency of the failure. By analyzing these data, 
we can determine the suitable method that can be implemented to prevent 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background of Study 
 
 Power system protection is deal with the protection of electrical 
equipment in electrical power system from faults by isolating the faulted part 
from the healthy parts of electrical network. If the fault is not isolated, it will 
affect other equipments and damaged them before disabling the whole power 
system network. [01] 
 
The objective of a protection system is to keep the power system remains 
in stable condition by isolating the faulted equipment in shortest time as possible. 
By doing this, we can keep the network in service and the status of the equipment 
will be ensured to be saved from further damage. The second objective of a 
protection system is to minimize interruptions. To minimize the interruption the 
protective device must be selective, to be able to decide and to isolate only the 
faulted equipment and not the healthy equipments. This is because the objective 
in protection system is to keep the system in good condition as possible and still 
be running even when fault happen. 
 
There are two basic components in protection system which are: 





 In this project, I am conducting a study that involves the application of 
condition based monitoring via online onto the protection system. The concept of 
condition based monitoring is evaluating the equipment using real time data that 
obtained via online then use it to evaluate the condition of the equipment without 
have to take out the equipment. The normal practice is, you have to take the 
equipment from service to check its condition. This practice will cause the 
network to be halted in the period of the maintenance. 
 
 Currently electrical equipment such as relay is still not readily assessable 
using this online monitoring technique. These electrical equipments are part of 
protection system, so if the online condition based monitoring can be applied it 
can help us to monitor the whole protection system process and condition of the 
whole system. This then will allows us to avoid a fault from happening and 




1.2 Problem Statement 
 
 The normal practice in maintaining the protection system nowadays 
require maintenance interval which is the schedule of the maintenance based on 
time interval that is decided by the previous condition of the equipment recorded. 
We can only check the equipment condition when we perform the routine 
maintenance, but in between that, we do not know what is happening. We may do 
a maintenance check up routine today but a fault may happen just after we 
finished our maintenance and causing damage to the equipment.  
 
 Also, the more frequent the maintenances are done, the higher the cost 
will be. When performing maintenance, we have to consider the cost of man 
power, the cost of maintaining the equipments and the cost when we halted the 
3 
 
network. Why do we need to halt the network? It is due to the maintenance 
procedure of the normal routine maintenance check. We have take the equipment 
off the network to avoid any damage to happen to the whole system or even 
damage to the maintenance personal that is conducting the check. This means that 
during maintenance interval it is non-productive period. 
 
 One of the solutions is by using online condition based monitoring. But as 
for the protective electrical equipments such as relay, it is not as readily 
assessable using this technique.  
 
1.3 Objective and Scope of Study 
 
 The objective of this project is to apply the online condition based 
monitoring onto protection system devices. This will allow us to obtain and 
gather the real time data and use them to do the analysis to determine the 
condition of the protection equipment. This will help us to get rid the concept of 
maintenance interval, save the costs of the whole process and remain the system 
to be in operation without having to remove the equipment while we gathering 
the data. 
 
 My work scopes is include the study on the protection system equipments, 
the condition based monitoring process, performing and creating the procedure to 















2.1 Protection System 
 
 The purpose of a protection system is to isolate faulted electrical 
component from affecting other healthy parts within the shortest time as possible. 
This is to ensure the safeguard of the equipment while keeping as much network 
as possible to still be in operation. [02] An unprotected system also can affect 
human life and its surrounding. When a fault happens, the possibilities of arching, 
flashover or equipment to explode are high. This will result in damage not only to 
the equipment itself but also to human, animals and other things around it. 
 
 
There are two basic components in protection system which are: 























Figure 1: Components in Protection System 
 
 
 The scope of protection system covers from the output part of the current 
transformer, relay and tripping circuit. Sensing device (current transformer) and 
circuit breaker are excluded from protection system because it falls under primary 
equipment category.  
 
 So in this project, I will only focus on those parts and excluding the 
current transformer and circuit breaker. As you can see in the figure 1 
(highlighted parts), those are the section which covers by protection system. Later 
on, I will explain more about the components that included at those areas. 
 
 So, how does a circuit breaker trip? What cause it to operate? To gains the 





















Figure 2: Operation Flow of Circuit Breaker Tripping 
 
 First, when a fault happens, it will cause the voltage or current level to 
rise (spike) from the normal condition. This can be explained based on the Ohm‟s 
law: V= I/R. Fault are the result of short circuit, and short circuit means 
resistance is small. So, when R is minimum, current, I will increase. This 
increment can be detected/sense by the sensing devices. Transducer works by 
lowering the voltage/current value to the level where it matches the relay rating. 
As for the current, the normal relay rating values are from 1- 5 amp. 
 
 When the relay is operated, it will initiate the tripping circuit to activate 
the circuit breaker which will break the circuit. This is to isolate the fault from 
spreading to other parts of the equipment. The shorter time taken to isolate the 




  2.2 Types of Maintenance  
  
 RCM or Reliability Centered Maintenance is a scheduled maintenance 
program to optimize system reliability. As for inexpensive and non-critical 
equipments, the CM method will be applied. While the expensive and critical 













Figure 3: Simplified Block Diagram of RCM 
 
   
 Corrective Maintenance (CM) is the most commonly used type of 
maintenance. This type of maintenance is applied only when the equipment 
already faulty. The purpose of this maintenance is to repair and to correct the 
problem of the equipment, usually results in replacing the components. Example 
of the equipment that used this type of maintenance is light bulb and small 
exhaust fans. 
 
 Another type of maintenance is the Preventive Maintenance (PM) which 












periodic basis, for example – annually. The main concerns about the preventive 
maintenance are time and cost. This type of maintenance is balanced based on 
these two points. For example in case of lubricating oil for a car, it needs to be 
change for every 3000 miles or every 6 months whichever come first. We can 
change it earlier but it will increase the maintenance cost. Here we can observe 
that preventive maintenance does not focus of the condition of the lubricating oil 


























2.2.1 Condition Based Monitoring, CBM 
 
 CBM is the process of gathering and monitoring the information available 
from the desired components. These components generate monitoring 
information during normal operation (without need to shutdown the operation), 
and the information can be assessed at a convenient location remote from the 
substation. The information can came from: 
 Diagnostic and performance data 
 Maintenance history 
 Operator/event logs 
 Design data 
All this data are required to make timely decisions about maintenance 
requirements of major/critical equipment. This methodology is often regarded as 
having existed for many years, it is in fact a recently developed methodology that 
has evolved over the past three decades from precursor maintenance methods.[7] 
 
 CBM is using the assumption that all equipment will worsen and that 
partial or complete loss of function will occur. CBM monitor the condition or 
performance of equipment through the data that gathered, analyzed, trended and 
used to predict equipment failures. When the failure is predicted, the action to 
prevent or delay it from happening can be taken. That is why CBM is said to be 
able to increase the reliability of the equipments. 
 
 The main goal of CBM is to optimize the reliability level of the 
equipments. To obtain that, we need to determine the need for maintenance 
activities based on equipment‟s condition. CBM assumes that equipment has 
indicators that can be monitored and analyzed to determine the need for condition 
directed maintenance activities. CBM allows the lowest cost and most effective 
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maintenance programme by determining the correct activity at the correct time. 
The advantages of CBM are including these: 
 
 Non-invasive Maintenance:  
Experience has shown that keeping human hands away from equipment 
known to be working correctly enhances reliability of the system. By 
using CBM, the system is kept in its normal operating state, without 
human intervention for checking. Therefore, it will reduce the risk of 
damage, or risk of leaving the system in an inoperable state after a manual 
test.  
 
 Virtually Continuous Monitoring: 
CBM can report component failure problems within seconds or minutes 
of when they happen. This will reduce the percentage of problems that are 
discovered through incorrect relaying performance. By contrast, a 
component failure discovered by normal maintenance (CM or PM) may 
have been there for much of the time interval between tests. The frequent 
or continuous nature of CBM makes the effective verification interval far 
shorter than any required CM maximum interval. 
 
 To further explaining the concept of CBM, we can refer the example 
about the lubricating oil earlier, if we can do a test to evaluate the condition of the 
lubricating oil, we may able to extend its usage for another 1000 miles which 
definitely save cost by increasing its time period. 
 
 CBM is still in the introduction stage, many developments and researches 
are done regarding this type of maintenance. The goal of this project is to be able 
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In the first phase of this project, I have focused on doing studies about the 
elements that will be used in this project to gained better understanding of the 
topic. Most of the elements in this topic are new to me although I have studied 
some of them before but it not in details.  
 
I have focused on studying: 
 
i. Protection system 
 Overview of protection system 
 The components in protection system 
 The suitable devices to be apply with online CBM and its output 
 
ii. Maintenance 
 The general overview of maintenance 
 Types of maintenance 
 Choosing suitable maintenance method 
 
iii. Online Condition Based Monitoring 
 Online VS offline CBM 
 CBM flow 
 Data gathering 
 Data analysis 
 Risk assessment 
 Economic/cost analysis 
 
 After finished with literature review, I continue with the data gathering. 
First, I start with listing the problems and faults that possibly to happen in the 
protection system based on my reading. This is just to have the better 
understanding of the topic. The data that will be used in the analysis will be 
13 
 
requested from the utilities companies. We need to use the real maintenance data 
in this project to make sure the finding is reliable. As for this stage, I have 
already sent several requests for the data statistic on type of failure, root cause 
and their frequency. 
 
 Later, when the data and information are obtained, the project is 
continued with the data analysis and conducting the risk analysis assessment 
techniques. From here I will determine the most crucial element of the problems 
in the protection system. By forming the Quadrant Analysis, we can see the 
separation of 4 different categories. 
  
 The analysis will focus on the most crucial section of the Quadrant 
Analysis (we will go through all 4 sections if possible but the main focus is the 
main quadrant). We will determine the solution/method that can be used to detect 
and prevent the problems/faults from happen. 
 
 To complete the analysis, we also need to find out the implement cost. We 
need to present the suitable cost for the solutions. Cost can be the major factor of 
the implementation of the system in the real design. If the finding is not 
reasonable, we need to redo the analysis to find the better solution. 
 
 The final part of the project is the paper presentation, oral presentation 














RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
4.1 Problem in VCB 11kV Switchgear  
 
 In section 2.1 (literature review about protection system), I had mentioned 
about the areas covered by protection system. These areas cover from the output 
of the current transformer to the circuit breaker. Using the example of VCB 11kV 
switchgear, I had conducted some analysis about the types of faults/problems 
happened within the system. The diagram of actual equipment can be referred in 
the appendices. 
 
 The components inside VCB 11kV switchgear can be divided into two 
categories, AC and DC components. As for the AC, the components are 
connected with AC source from the incoming feeder. But as described before, the 
scope of protection system only cover from the output of current transformer to 
the circuit breaker only. 
 
 Current transformers are connected to the incoming feeder. The current 
transformer will step down the current value in its secondary circuit. These 
current will be used for the metering and the monitoring of the system‟s 
condition. If there is a fault in the system, the current value will rise from the 
normal value. This can be detected by the relay, and the relay will act by 
activating the tripping circuit which then causing the tripping coil inside circuit 
breaker to energize and tripping/ breaking the circuit. This action will make sure 
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that the fault is not spreading to the whole network, just isolated in the affected 
area. 
 Here I have listed the problems that can happen inside the protection 
system. (AC and DC components) 
 























 The area highlighted in single line diagram (figure 7) is the components 
that are included in the protection system for AC components. I first, identified 
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the components involved and listed the problem that may occurred according to 





















































































Table 1: Terminal Transformer 
 
 
  Sub-component   Potential Malfunction 
  1 Terminal Block A damaged terminal (rusty) 
Voltage  
Transformer     B melted terminal due to high current 
  2 Wiring A wire bitten by animal (rat) 
      B wire melted due to high current 
      C poor insulation/coating 
      D loose termination 
  3 
Potential 
Transformer A winding insulation failure 
      B winding shorted 
  4 
Miniature Circuit 
Breaker A lever stuck in 'ON' position 
      B magnetic trip inside MCB failed 
  5 
Voltmeter Selector 
Switch A faulty selector switch 





Table 2: Metering Current Transformer 
 
 
  Sub-component   Potential Malfunction 
  1 Terminal Block A damaged terminal (rusty) 
Metering 
Current     B melted terminal due to high current 
Transformer 2 Wiring A wire bitten by animal (rat) 
      B wire melted due to high current 
      C poor insulation/coating 
      D loose termination 
  3 
Current 
Transformer A winding insulation failure 
      B winding shorted 




Table 3: Protection Current Transformer 
 
 
  Sub-component   Potential Malfunction 
 
1 Terminal Block A damaged terminal (rusty) 
Protection 
Current   
 
B melted terminal due to high current 
Transformer 2 Wiring A wire bitten by animal (rat) 
      B wire melted due to high current 
      C poor insulation/coating 
      D loose termination 
  3 
Current 
Transformer A winding insulation failure 
      B winding shorted 
  4 
Relay Test Terminal 
Block A RTTB stuck in 'disconnect' position 
    (RTTB) B RTTB slot not working 






Table 4: Heater 
 
 
  Sub-component   Potential Malfunction 
   1 Double Pole MCB A leaver stuck in 'ON' position 
 Heater     B magnetic trip inside MCB failed 
   2 Wiring A wire bitten by animal (rat) 
       B wire melted due to high current 
       C poor insulation/coating 
       D loose termination 
   3 Thermal Switch A switch stuck 
       B switch disconnected 
   4 Heater A heating element rusty 
       B heating element doesn’t warm up 
       C overheated 
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4.1.2 DC components 
 
 As for DC components, it consist of tripping and closing circuit. 
Referring to the single line diagram below, we can observe that the highlighted 
area which is the tripping circuit consists of DC components. These components 
are powered up by 30V DC voltage and used to control the closing and tripping 
circuit. 
 
 Why we must use DC voltage for the closing and tripping circuit? This is 




















































































Table 5: Spring Charge Motor 
 
  Sub-component   Potential Malfunction 
  1 Double Pole MCB a leaver stuck in 'ON' position 
Spring 
Charging      b 
magnetic trip inside MCB 
failed 
Motor 2 Wiring a wire bitten by animal (rat) 
      b 
wire melted due to high 
current 
      c poor insulation/coating 
      d loose termination 
  3 Limit Switches a faulty limit switch 
  4 Motor a faulty motor 
 
 
Table 6: CB Closing & Tripping Circuit 
 
  Sub-component   Potential Malfunction 
  1 Selector Switch a faulty switch 
Circuit 
Breaker 2 Two Poles Trip &  a faulty switch 
Closing and   Close Switch b   
Tripping 
Circuit 3 Protection Relay a internal relay fault 
      b faulty relay output contact 
      c relay miscoordination 
  4 Closing Coil a faulty closing coil 
  5 Anti-pumping Relay a faulty anti-pumping relay 
  6 Relay Test Terminal  a 
RTTB stuck in disconnect 
position 
    Block b RTTB slot not working 
  7 CB Aux Contact a faulty aux contact 
 
 
Table 7: Power Supply Protection  
 
  Sub-component   Potential Malfunction 
Power 
Supply To 1 Relay Test Terminal a 
RTTB stuck in 'disconnect' 
position 
Protection 
Relay   Block b RTTB slot not working 
  2 Protection Relay a faulty power supply module 
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4.2 Analysis of Relay Fault Data  
 
The scope of this project is to analyze each of the components within 
protection system from AC to DC and then choose the most critical and suitable 
parts to be apply with Condition Based Monitoring. The data is suppose to be 
collected from the utility companies based on their actual record and as for that, I 
have contacted quite a number of utility companies ranging from local to 
international companies. Most of them replied that they do not keep record on the 
information or the information was confidential. I also have taken other 
approaches including searched for the information from library, books, internet 
and journal.  
 
The only related information that I acquire was from a paper written by 
Roy Moxley with the title of “Analyze Relay Fault Data to Improve Service 
Reliability” [11]. In this paper, the author has analyzed the data taken from an 
anonymous utility company using 18 months of data (January 1996-August 
1997).  
 
As for brief introduction, protective relay is one of the parts in the 
protection system and come with many varieties and mainly can be divided into 
three categories which are electromechanical relay, solid state relays and 
microprocessor relay. The operation of a protective relay can be measured by its 
security against false operation,  the dependability to operate for faults in its zone 
of protection,  speed of operation and its impact on control of the overall power 
system.  
 
In this section, I am applying a reliability analysis using the fault tree 
method in finding the total unavailability caused by the failures of the relay. 
Based on the data from [11], there are a total of 1425 events, which 1346 of them 
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are correct operations (94.5%), 66 incorrect operations (4.6%) and 13 failures to 
operate (0.91%).  
 
First, we will look into the overall incorrect operation and the failures to 
operate by breaking them using IEEE Power System Relay Committee Working 
Group 117 Report, Transmission Relay System Performance Comparison [12] 
which is shown in table 8. This is just to give the better overview of the failures 
listed in the data. 
 
 
Table 8: IEEE Working Group I17 Incorrect Operation Reporting 
 













































































































































































7   301-400 0% 0%  14% 0%  14% 
49   201-300 2% 4%  4% 12%  22% 
13   101-200 0% 0%  15% 31%  46% 
5   51-100 0% 0%  0% 0%  0% 
705   4.8-51* 1% 0.6%  2.5% 2.1% 0.14% 6.4% 




Then, from the total of incorrect operation and the failures to operate 
listed in appendix 4 and 5, we can break down the types of the failure into few 





Table 9: False Operation and Failure to Operate of Protective Relay 
 
 False Operations Failure to Operate 
Setting or coordination failure 18 (27 %) 1 (7.7%) 
Accessory component failure 12 (18%) 10 (76.9%) 
Human Caused 12 (18%) 0 
Relay design hole 9 (13.5%) 0 
Induced Signal/Noise 5 (7.6%) 1 (7.7%) 
Force majeure  5 (7.6%) 1 (7.7%) 
Relay component failure 3 (4.5%) 0 
Others 2 (3%) 0 
  
From these data, we can observe that the rate of the failure to happen for 
protective relay is relatively low (79 failures out of 1425 events). Logically this 
shows that the system can be consider as good, but as described before protection 
relay is a crucial and need to be 100% operational without any failure. 
 
The failure caused by false operation shows 5 times more frequent 
compared to the failure to operate. From the data in appendix 4 and 5, we can 
observe that most of the failures to trip are caused by either connected wires or 
circuit breaker problem. To overcome this, we must make sure that every activity 
that involves the protection system must be done thoroughly. All the setting, 
connection and the placement of the devices must be correct. 
 
To estimate the failure rate of the system, we can apply reliability analysis 
to get the estimation of the failure to happen. This can helps us to evaluate the 
system, determine the weak link and improve it. One of the easiest yet effective 




4.2.1 Reliability Analysis Using Fault Tree Method 
 
This is the method that will be used to find the total unavailability cause 
by protective relay based on the data from the previous anonymous utility 
company. Reliability is important because it is one of the most important key 
elements in the protection system and is defined as the ability of equipment not to 
fail in the events of the faults in the protected zone. The use of backup protection 
can help to cover any failure happen in primary protection system [01]. We use 
the fault tree method to evaluate the part of the system which influences the 
probability of a particular failure. The failure of interest is called the Top Event. 
 
 For the better understanding of the method, I have included an example 
as in the figure below, which modeled a protection system consist of circuit 
breaker, current transformer, relay, DC supply and associated control wiring.(this 
is the original/planned design that suppose to be use if not because of the 
insufficient of data). 
 
 Failure of any one component would render the whole protection system 
in-operate, therefore the reliability of each component must be ensure.  This 





Figure 9: Fault Tree for Radial Line Protection with Redundant Relays 
 
The top event is usually described in terms of the event that occurred 
which in this case is protection fails to clear faults in the prescribed time. It is 
assumed the power system is faulted and it intended to detect/isolate the fault in a 
very short time. [13] 
 
OR gate Any of the failures can cause the protection system to fails. The 
probability is calculated using summation. For example: 
 
breaker fails (0.01)+CT fails (0.001)+both relays fails to 
trip(0.000001)+DC power fails(0.01)+wiring fails(0.0001)=0.0202 
AND gate Both failures must happen at the same time. AND gate is the expression 
of the redundant system. By adding redundant system, we can improve 
the system‟s reliability by decreasing the failure rate. 
 






The values in this example are only based on the assumption. From this 
analysis also, it is observed that when we use redundant system, we can increase 
the system reliability and decrease its probability to fail (this should be able to be 
proved if we have sufficient data for each component). 
 
Referring to the figure 11, using the same assumed value of the failure 
rates but instead of using redundant relay system, we are using single relay. So 
we do not use AND gate anymore, the calculation only include OR gate which is: 
 
breaker fails (0.01)+CT fails (0.001)+relay fails to trip(0.001)+DC power 
fails(0.01)+wiring fails(0.0001)=0.0212 
 
It is proved that when we use the redundant protection system, we can increase 
the reliability of the protection system, in this case by 0.001. This example only 
shows a basic protection system, we can include other components and change 
the failure rate using the data that we have. 
 
 
4.2.2 Device Failure Rates and Unavailability 
 
Back to our analysis, because of the limited data, we will only focus on 
protective relay. In this analysis, we will find the device failure rate and the value 
of unavailability of the protective relay used. A device failure rate gives us the 
number of failures we can expect per unit time. During the useful lifetime of a 
device, we frequently assume a constant failure rate. Failure rates can come from 
theoretical calculations, such as MIL-HDBK- 17F [12] parts-count procedures, or 
from field experience.  
 
For example, suppose there is an in-service population of 10,000 devices, 
and we observe 10 failures of devices in one year. An estimate of the failure rate 
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from these field data is10/10,000 = 0.001 failures per year. The reciprocal gives 
an estimated MTBF (Mean Time between Failures) of 1000 years. This does not 
imply that a device is likely to last 1000 years. Instead it is a reliability figure 
valid during the useful lifetime of the device. 
 
Failure rates are very useful in predicting maintenance costs, but do not 
tell the whole story about whether a device will be available when called upon to 
perform. Thus we need to consider unavailability. Unavailability is the fraction of 
time a device cannot perform. It is unit-less. Based on [6] we can calculate 
unavailability from a failure rate and the time it takes to detect and repair a 
failure. 
 
   
 
 
q - Unavailability 
T - Average down-time per failure 
MTBF - Mean Time between Failures. 
 
 
Each failure causes downtime T. Therefore the system is unavailable for 
time T out of total time MTBF. The fraction of time the system is not available is 
therefore q= T/MTBF. Assuming that self-tests function of the relay detects 
problems within seconds, but it will take around two days to repair the failure 
once it is detected. If the alarm contact of the relay is monitored, then the relay 
can be backed in service in two days but if the alarm contact is NOT monitored 
and suppose we test relay every one year, the T will become 356 days which is 
182.5 times worse. This show how important is CBM. 
 
q =     T 
       MTBF 
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In our case, it is recorded that there are 1425 operations in 18 months that 
involve electromechanical, solid–state and digital relays. So to calculate our 
MTBF, we will divide all the failures for each category based on 1425 operations 
per 18 months. Because we are focusing only to protective relay and we earlier 
assumed that the average down-time per failure T=2days, we will use this value 
through out all the calculation for unavailability. The example for the calculation 
of MTBF and q are per below: 
  
(Based on the setting/coordinate failure for false operation) 
 

















                                  = 79.1667 
 
 
 So, to calculate in year, 
 79.1667                          X 12 
           
             = 950   
 
If we take setting/coordination failure for false operation (18 failures) 
 18/950 = 0.0189  
 
 
The MTBF for this will be  
 1/0.0189 = 52.78 years 
 
As for the unavailability, q 
 q= 2days/52.78 years 
















From the data in appendix 4 and 5, we can majorly divide the failures into 
two categories, false operation and failure to operate. From the main branches, 
we can further narrows down the failure into 8 sub-branches and calculate the 
MTBF and unavailability for each branches. 
 
 
 4.2.3 False Operation 
 
a) 4.2.3.1 Setting/Coordination Failure 
 Line differential relays with fuses taps on line - 5 
 System conditions not considered when applying setting - 4 
 Over-current/circulating current when lines is parallel  - 3 
 System delayed/repeated tripping of adjacent lines - 2 
 Frequency relays operated for transient conditions - 2 
 Incorrect echo signals - 1 
 Setting not changed for new breaker - 1 
MTBF = 52.78 
Unavailability = 0.0378 
 
The prime cause of the false operations in this category is caused by 
tapped loads on differentially protected lines and conditions do not modeled. 
Tapped load coordination is using the sum of both line end currents provides 
shorter coordinating margins than with a single end time over-current relay 
supervising the differential relay. By using multiple settings groups we can 
use external inputs to change to a setting that accounts for paralleling sources 
or other changed system conditions.  
 
Comparing the single and multiple setting groups, we found that the 
settings/coordination-caused false trips can be reduced by over 50% 
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(redundant system, proved in the section 4.2.1 when we compare the usage of 




b)  Accessory Component Failure 
 Copper pilot wires being shorted  
o Long term failures - 3 
o Fault on nearby lines - 3 
 Bad wiring - 5 
o Ground return wire not installed 
o Control wiring problem 
o CT wired backward 
o One phase of CT wired incorrect 
o Switches wrongly connected/labeled 
 Electromechanical auxiliary relay continually keying permissive 
causing transmitter to stay keyed on -1 
MTBF = 79.17 
Unavailability = 0.0252 
 
As for false trips that caused by copper pilot wires being shorted (6 
failures), this then has eventually causing a false trip on an external fault and 
can be handled using long-term monitoring of communication channels and 
high-speed supervision of trips with a loss of channel signal. 
 
Then, for the other cause which is bad wiring, the use of relay with the 
capability to display phase rotation and steady state operating quantities can 
provides a means of checking secondary CT and VT wiring, that allows us to 
be alerted if there is any bad wiring. For the other accessory component 
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failure, it can be avoided by using relay with a channel monitor and timer 
alarm. 
c)  Human-caused Misoperation  
 Vandals during break-in (unauthorized breaker operation) - 8 
 Transfer trip by accident during maintenance - 1 
 False trip caused by vibration (from drilling) - 1 
 RTU was bumped causing it to operate - 1 
 Wiring dropped into pool of water - 1 
 
MTBF = 79.17 
Unavailability = 0.0252 
 
Based on the recorded data, it seems that the utility company has been 
experienced a break-in that occurred on Thursday, May 8, 1997. First, it 
shows that the area was not guarded well although it is known that the 
integrity of this area is very important to be remains intact. Also, in the 
equipment aspect, the security measure was insufficient to prevent breaker 
operation by unauthorized persons (tripped by the vandals). It is crucial for 
the security system to be upgraded. 
 
 
d)  Relay Design Hole 
 Distance relays operating on either PT failure or a remote fault - 5 
 Electromechanical differential relays operating on inrush - 3 
 Solid-state phase comparison relay operated for a fault in parallel line 
(may be included as setting error) – 1 
MTBF = 105.56 
Unavailability = 0.0189 
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The false operation that falls into this category is considered based on 
the event that relay misoperated even though it is tested as OK. The failures 
in this category can be traced back to the manufacturing but considering that 
relays are used in large quantity, the number of false operation caused by 
relay design hole can be say low in number, credit to the qualification testing 
by relay manufactures. 
 
 
e)  Induced Signal/Noise 
 Spike in DC circuit - 1 
 Noise spike in pilot wire - 1 
 Voltage spike causing pilot wire relay to operate - 1 
 Microwave noise - 1 
 Noise induced into phase comparison relay - 1 
 
MTBF = 190 
Unavailability = 0.0105 
 
Four of the five instances of induced signal-caused or noise-caused 
trips were in communications circuits, not in the relays themselves. The 
problems with using a communications system is that it is subject to noise, 
such as microwave with a protection scheme dependent on accurate 
communication. Direct or multiplexed fiber systems would be more 
appropriate for communication-dependent protection schemes. A circuit 
breaker operated during a dc ground search with no relay targets recorded. 
With no record of a device operation available, any corrective action can only 





f)  Force Majeure 
 Water  leaked into Buchholz Relay - 1 
 Rain water leaked into pressure relay - 1 
 Concussion from explosion cause relay contact to close - 3 
 
MTBF = 190 
Unavailability = 0.0105 
 
Force Majeure is defined as the natural and unavoidable catastrophes 
that interrupt the expected course of events and restrict participants from 
fulfilling obligations which in this case, resulted into the relay failure. Three 
of the incidents were cause from a nearby industrial explosion that originated 
from nearby source while the other two were caused by water leaked.  
 
 
g)  Relay Component Failure 
 Component failure in electromechanical/solid-state relay – 3 
MTBF = 316.67 
Unavailability, q = 0.0063 
 
There are three relay component failure that caused by system fault. 
The concern is that these failures are mostly undetectable not until there are 
false operation happen. To overcome this, we can use a relay with self-
checking diagnostics which able to determine that a problem has occurred 







h)  Others 
MTBF = 475 
Unavailability = 0.0042 
 
 There are two tripping but cannot be determined the causes of the 




4.2.4 Failure to Operate 
 
a)  Setting/Coordination Failure 
 
MTBF = 950 
Unavailability = 0.0021 
 
The electromechanical TOC relay did not operate for fault at 110 Amp 
was caused by a fault below set pickup in a time over-current (TOC) relay. 
Adjust the setting to prevent this from repeating 
 
 
b)  Accessory Component Failure 
 Trip coil and mechanical/electrical failure of breaker – 5 
 Shorted/mis-wired pilot wires – 4 
 CT wires in reversed to directional over-current relay - 1 
 
MTBF = 95 




 The main cause of the accessory component failure is regarding wiring 
which has been pointed to be responsible for ten times more failures to trip 
compared to other causes. All ten failures in this category was related to 
wiring. 
 
 First, the trip coil failures and mechanical/electrical failure can be 
overcome using the trip coil monitoring which is available in microprocessor 
relay. As for the failures that caused by shorted/mis-wired pilot wires, either 
the monitoring of differential communications or replacement of copper wire 
with optical fiber can be adapted. For the last cause, the usage of 
microprocessor relay will allows us to be alerted that CT is in reverse with a 
glance at the meter display. 
 
 
c)  Induced Signal/Noise 
MTBF = 950 
Unavailability = 0.0021 
 
 There was excessive noise from an arching conductor which later blocked 
a power signal line carrier signal. If we are able to use trending in this 
situation, we can detect and overcome this problem beforehand. 
 
 
d)  Relay Component Failure 
MTBF = 950 
Unavailability = 0.0021 
 
 Electromechanical pilot wire differential failed to trip due to aging relay. 












Table 10: Summary of MTBF and Unavailability  
 
 False Operation Failure to Operate 
MTBF Unavailability MTBF Unavailability 
 Setting/Coordination 
Failure 
52.78 0.0378 950 0.0021 
 Accessory 
Component Failure 
79.17 0.0252 95 0.02 
 Human-Caused 79.17 0.0252 - - 
 Relay-Design Hole 105.56 0.0189 - - 
 Induced 
Signal/Noise 
190 0.0105 950 0.0021 
 Force Majeure 190 0.0105 - - 
 Relay Component 
Failure 
316.67 0.0063 950 0.0021 




































4.3 Suitable Components with CBM for protection system 
 
As stated previously, Condition Based Monitoring is still not widely 
applied into protection system yet but, there are several components which 
already developed with the capability of condition based monitoring which can 
be used in the protection system. These components may not specifically built for 
protection system but still, they can be developed to fit into our objective. This is 
one stepping stone in achieving our target which is to apply condition based 
monitoring into protection system. I believe that in later future, we will see that 
condition based monitoring will be further used into every components and 
equipment available. 
 
4.3.1 865 Differential Protection Relay by Allen-Bradley 
 
This differential relay is built to provide protection function mainly to 
protect transformer for distribution networks of utilities, industry, power plants 
and offshore applications as well as motor and generator differential protection. 
In addition, it also include several programmable functions such as thermal and 










Figure 10: 865 Differential Protection Relay 
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The protection features that are provided by the relay are including 
differential over-current protection (87), over-current stage (50/51), current 
unbalance protection (46), earth fault protection (50N/51G,N), thermal overload 
protection (49), circuit-breaker failure protection (50BF), arc fault protection 
(50ARC/50NARC), programmable stages (99) and inverse time operation. 
 
This relay also has the functions that allow it to measure the data and conducting 
the monitoring of the system. The measured data are including: 
 Frequency (Hz) 
 Phase currents 
 15-minute average for all phase currents 
 Primary value of two zero sequence/residual current CTs 
 Positive and Negative sequence currents 
 Negative sequence current related to positive sequence current (for 
unbalance protection) 
 Total harmonic distortion of phase currents 
 14 inputs and 9 outputs 
 
As for the monitoring functions, it has: 
 
Event Logs 
The event log buffer should have enough room to record the last 50 events. For 
each trip function, a total of 8 historic events shall be logged 
 
Disturbance Recorder 
A 12-channel disturbance recorder will record all the measured signals such as, 
currents, voltages and the status information of digital inputs and outputs. The 




Current Transformer Supervision 
The device supervises the external wiring between the device terminal and 
current transformers (CT) and the CT themselves. 
 
Circuit Breaker Condition Monitoring 
The relay will have a condition monitoring function that supervises the wearing 
of the circuit breaker. The condition monitoring can give an alarm for the need of 
circuit-breaker maintenance before the circuit-breaker condition is critical. 
 
System Clock and Synchronization 
The internal clock of the relay is used to time stamp events and disturbance 
recordings. 
 
Running Hour Counter 
This function calculates the total active time of the selected digital input, virtual 
I/O or output matrix output signal. 
 
Programmable Timers 
The relay is to include four programmable timers that can be used together with 
the user‟s programmable logic or to control setting groups and other applications 
that require actions based on calendar time. 
 
Combined Over-current Status 
The relay shall include the function to collect faults, faults types and registered 
fault current of all enabled over-current stages. 
 
Self Supervision 
The relay will also have the functions of micro controller and the associated 




4.3.2 Line Resonance Analysis (LIRA) 
 
Line Resonance Analysis or LIRA is a method developed based on 
Frequency Domain Reflectometry. LIRA is still going development systems that 
aim to be used online, detecting local or global changes in the cable electrical 
parameters as a consequence of insulation faults or degradation. 
 
Moreover, the Condition Based Monitoring of installed wire systems can 
able us to check the reliability of the wire system and tackle the aging problem. 
Aging of a wire system can result in loss of critical functions of the equipment 
energized by the system or in loss of critical information relevant to the decision 
making process and operator actions. For further understanding of LIRA, you can 






















CONCLUSSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
As for this project goes, I realize that online condition based monitoring 
for protection system is still something uncommon. It still in the research and 
development stage which make it difficult to obtain the information and data 
regarding the topic. 
 
Most of the papers that I came across are about reliability analysis which 
requires us to input the data and conduct several calculations based on the 
developed formula. Still, this cannot be considered as „online‟ because the data is 
collected beforehand. 
 
To applied the analysis to online condition based monitoring, we need to 
be able to collect the actual real-time data from the system, connect to the 
computer and analyze them using the specified software based on the existing 
reliability analysis. The main problem of this is to find the existing device that 
can collect the information that we need from the equipment that we desire. The 
current online condition based monitoring is focusing on the rotating machine 
such as motor by calculating the vibrations and such other parameter of the 
motor. This is made possible with the existing of the sensors with those 
functions. 
 
My discovery from the readings that I have done led to several reliability 
analysis such as using fault tree analysis [13] and reliability analysis using RA 
(reliability of availability) and RO (reliability of operation) [14].  
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To perform these analyses, I require a set of actual data of the failure in 
the protection system. Most of the companies that I contacted stated that they do 
not have the analyzed data as per my request. This is because the information of 
the failure in the protection system is not usually sorted in softcopy, they only 
kept them in hardcopy as it is usually hand-written by the maintenance personnel. 
 
Even for a well-known international research such as Roy Moxley faced 
the problem of obtaining the required data and only managed to get it from one 
utility company (which is kept as anonymous due to confidential issues). This 
shows that data gathering is indeed very difficult to be obtained. 
 
Using the information and the finding that I obtained, I have found several 
existing equipments that are suitable to be applied in the protection system based 
on the functions that they provided (condition based monitoring). Despite that, 
there are still many parts in protection system that cannot be equipped with 
condition based monitoring and further research and studies need to be done. It is 
hoped that in future, online condition based monitoring can be fully applied into 
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Relay Component Failure 
4/8/96 Reclosing relay with shorted diode, closed in three times, loss of air pressure in 
circuit breaker caused trip times to increase until backup relay (on 230 kV bank) 
cleared fault on 34.5 kV feeder. 
3/15/96 Staged fault caused adjacent 500 kV line to trip by “finding” a faulty 
component that removed restraint and caused operation on reverse fault. This 
sent a direct transfer trip to the other end. 
6/29/97 230 kV line tripped due to leaking capacitor in electromechanical distance relay. 
Relay Design Hole 
1/30/96 Two electromechanical distance relays operated for remote bus fault: “the relay 
contacts have a history of drifting closed when the line voltage goes dead.” 
They did not cause outage. The line was already dead. 
8/11/96 Solid-state phase comparison relay tripped for a fault on parallel line. Relays 
were tested with no problems found. 
9/11/96 Electromechanical distance relays tripped on PT failure; line did not trip. 
9/23/96 Electromechanical transformer differential misoperated during inrush. 
Relay tested OK. 
9/25/96 E/M DCB scheme misoperated at one end of line due to fault detector 
operating for external fault and forward looking distance relay “drifting” 
closed on low voltage (two occurrences on separate lines for same fault). 
10/17/96 Electromechanical transformer differential misoperated during inrush. 
Relay tested OK. 
11/6/96 Electromechanical transformer differential misoperated during inrush. 
Relay tested OK. 
Accessory Component Failure 
1/27/96 9:41 Electromechanical pilot wire differential false trip on bad pilot. 
1/27/96 9:48 Electromechanical pilot wire differential false trip on bad pilot. 
8/1/96 E/M POTT scheme false tripped on external fault due to e/m aux failure 
causing transmitter to stay keyed on. 
8/1/96 Solid-state bus differential tripped on external fault due to a ground return 
wire not installed during addition of new equipment to station. 
9/18/96 Three transformer banks tripped due to false transfer trip during test of breaker 
failure relays. Blocking switches were mislabeled on newly installed equipment. 
11/20/96 Directional overcurrent relay opened while switching a capacitor, due to a control 
wiring problem. 
1/6/97 Fault on adjacent line damaged pilot wires, causing electromechanical pilot 




 5/6/97 Electromechanical pilot wire differential tripped on external fault. 
Apparently shorted pilot. 
6/24/97 Transformer false tripped on first load because CT wired backwards. 
7/8/97 Same transformer tripped again due to one phase wired incorrectly. 
Setting or Coordination Failure 
1/16/96 Electromechanical pilot wire differential operated on fuse-cleared fault. 
Electromechanical pilot wire differential cannot coordinate with fuse, cleared 
faults. 
3/15/96 500 kV staged fault caused an echo-tripping permissive echo that eventually 
caused a false trip on that line. Line tripped again on second staged fault test on 
adjacent line. 
3/18/96 Overfrequency relay tripped on transient caused by line tripping. Relay operated 
correctly, given its settings, but incorrectly, given its application. 
3/25/96 Relay operated for a repeated fault on an adjacent 345 kV line. This was a 
“correct” incorrect operation. Could be described as a coordination failure. 
4/5/96 Transfer trip inadvertently sent during disconnect switching 230 kV line. 
4/5/96 Electromechanical pilot wire differential tripped after fuse-cleared fault—lack of 
coordination. 
5/17/96 Electromechanical pilot wire differential tripped after fuse-cleared fault—lack of 
coordination. 
7/4/96 Electromechanical pilot wire differential false tripped due to circulating current 
when transformers were paralleled. 
9/19/96 4.8 kV bus tripped on backup due to slow trip of downstream fault (coordination 
failure). 
12/12/96 Overcurrent relay on transformer tripped on back-up when a fault on a feeder did 
not clear; coordination error. 
1/16/97 Underfrequency relays tripped on the transient when a breaker tripped on low SF6 
pressure. Settings error 
2/27/97 EM TOC relay tripped on circulating current when bus tie closed for routine 
work. 
3/21/97 Electromechanical pilot wire differential overtripped on fault cleared by fuse 
tapped on line. 
4/4/97 Electromechanical pilot wire differential tripped due to circulating current when 
lines paralleled. 
5/19/97 EM directional overcurrent tripped when line was paralleled. 
5/23/97 Electromechanical pilot wire differential overtripped on fault cleared by fuse 
tapped on line. 





 Induced Signal/Noise 
3/15/96 Staged fault at a 500 kV line caused false trips due to noise induced into phase 
comparison relay at same station, which sent a transfer trip to other end. 
7/23/96 Breaker tripped due to a spike in the dc circuit during a dc ground search. 
No relay targets were reported. 
10/16/96 Electromechanical pilot wire differential relay misoperated due to external 
230 kV fault sending “noise spike” into pilot wires, which tripped one end of 
34.5 kV line. 
12/17/96 Fault on nearby line created a voltage spike, causing a pilot wire relay to operate 
(line did not have drainage reactor). 
8/23/97 500 kV false trip due to microwave noise, causing current differential relay to 
operate. 
Mystery 
3/18/96 230 kV line tripped for fault on reverse line. No targets found on any relay. 
8/27/96 230 kV bus tripped during transfer of station service. No targets, no cause found. 
Human Caused 
4/25/96 500 kV line tripped on transfer trip accidentally sent during maintenance. 
11/4/96 Electromechanical pilot wire differential false tripped when “a construction crew 
was drilling on the adjacent relay panel when the relay was jarred closed.” 
12/31/96 Transformer tripped when RTU was bumped, causing it to operate. No relay 
targets (shows advantage of using relay trip contacts for operation). 
3/8/97 False trip of transformer due to wiring being dropped into a pool of water during 
work on transformer pressure relay. 
5/8/97 Vandals broke into substation. Tripped 8 breakers. No relay targets. Another 
reason to use relays to operate breakers. Break-in at 6:04 pm in May. 
Force Majoure 
2/20/96 Water leaked into Buchholz relay. 
11/11/96 “Concussion from a large explosion at X caused the relay contact to close” EM 
directional overcurrent relay (3 lines). 















































 Setting or Coordination Failure 
2/16/96 Electromechanical TOC relay did not operate for fault 1000 Amp. Cleared other end 
after 63 cycles. Fault self-cleared at 125 cycles. 
Accessory Component Failure 
1/29/96 6:36, CB failed to trip (reported as relay failure to trip) 
5/5/96 Electromechanical pilot wire differential at 34.5 kV failed to operate due to miswired 
ground lead, which allowed an induced voltage to counteract the tripping voltage. 
This caused 6 line trips followed by 5 reclosing & trips. Dispatcher could not 
determine where the fault was and closed in repeatedly to test lines. 
12/28/96 Breaker failed during trip for line fault (E/M POTT). Failure caused a bus fault to be 
detected. Breakers on the bus were blocked from tripping due to a large pump being 
started causing breaker failure of all incoming 230 kV feeds. 
12/28/96 After clearing of the breaker fault, station was attempted to re-energize. Fault was re- 
initiated and same problems happened again. 
1/6/97 E/M directional OC relay failed to trip due to CTs being reversed. Backup tripping 
cleared 5 incoming lines at 34.5 kV. Fault took approximately 15 seconds to clear. 
1/6/97 Failure to trip electromechanical pilot wire differential due to shorted pilot wires. 
Line cleared on time overcurrent backup. 
1/6/97 Failure to trip electromechanical pilot wire differential due to shorted pilot wires. 
Line cleared on time overcurrent backup. This was a repeat event 2 minutes following 
a successful reclose. It could be argued that if the pilot wire relay had tripped, the 
damage would have been limited and reclose would have held … maybe. 
1/6/97 Failure to trip EM TOC due to bad breaker. Breaker would not open until all current 
flow was interrupted elsewhere. Cleared 2 other lines. 
1/6/97 Pilot wire shorted caused failure to trip of electromechanical pilot wire differential. 
Two lines were cleared in backup. 
8/5/97 Failure to trip due to burnt trip coil (EM relays); two lines cleared on backup. 
Induced Signal/Noise 
1/6/97 Failure to trip of 230 kV E/M POTT primary protection scheme for the line caused by 
excessive noise from an arcing conductor swamped out the power line carrier receiver. 
Line tripped on backup after 24 cycles. 
Relay Component Failure 
5/24/96 Electromechanical pilot wire differential failed to trip due to bad “rectox unit” in 55- 
year-old relay. After failure relays were replaced by similar vintage relays. Six lines 
tripped as a result of failure to trip. 
 
 
